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HIGHLIGHTING A LOW POINT ON A HIGH COURT:
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE REMOVAL OF
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICE




It ain't over 'til it's over.... I'm confident all this will turn out for
the best in the end.'
-The Honorable Rolf Larsen
The decline and fall of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen
attracted national attention. For many, Justice Larsen's suspension, prosecu-
tion, impeachment, and removal were simply good theater-a sordid story of
drugs, sex, crime, violence, and political corruption. For others, the Larsen
tale was compelling for its moral that judges should henceforth be selected
on the basis of merit, rather than in partisan elections.2
I do not pretend to be above lurid theater, and in part II of this article I
chronicle the events that captivated the regional and sometimes national me-
dia, culminating in Justice Larsen's impeachment and removal from office.
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University; B.A. University of Wisconsin, J.D. Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Law School. Many thanks to John Gedid, Emily Field Van Tassel, and
Harry Witte for their comments, suggestions, and insights on earlier drafts, and to Greg Gelfand,
David Moffitt, and Geoff Moulton for steering me in the right direction at a couple of important
points along the way. Thanks also to Randy Ricciuti, Michael Sheldon, and Dave Snyder for
their able research support, and Tim Yuncker for his exceptional research and editorial
assistance.
I have served the Pennsylvania House of Representatives as a consultant on the impeach-
ment and removal of Justice Larsen, and am indebted to Speaker of the House H. William
Deweese, Judiciary Committee Chairman Thomas R. Caltagirone, and Special Counsel John
Moses for affording me that opportunity; without it, this article could not have been written. I
am especially grateful to Representative Frank Dermody, who chaired the Committee of House
Managers that prosecuted Justice Larsen in the Pennsylvania Senate; it was a pleasure and a
privilege to have served a legislator with his energy, evenhandedness, and dedication to
principle.
The views expressed in this article are mine alone, and not necessarily those of the Penn-
sylvania House of Representatives or any of its members.
1. Quoted in Bill Moushey, Larsen Out: Larsen Removed from High Court, Prr-rsBURGH
POsT-GAzETTE, June 14, 1994, at Al.
2. Bridget E. Montgomery & Christopher C. Conner, Partisan Elections: The Albatross of
Pennsylvania's Appellate Judiciary, 98 DICK. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1993) (characterizing merit selec-
tion legislation as response to "mandate for reform" precipitated by Larsen scandal and discuss-




At the same time, as an academic, I am drawn inexorably toward matters
more arid and obscure, and thus ultimately look to the Larsen imbroglio in
search of the lessons it offers to students of state constitutional law. I remain
unconvinced, however, that such lessons include an argument for merit-based
judicial selection. Clairvoyance is not ordinarily identified as a prerequisite
to service on commissions charged with assessing the merits of nominees for
judicial office. Nothing short of that, however, could enable such a commis-
sion to divine that a judicial nominee who had not theretofore been disci-
plined for misbehavior is nevertheless destined to become a miscreant and
should be disqualified on that basis. In Justice Larsen's case, that a more
"qualified" candidate might have been selected in his stead is merely fortui-
tous, unless one is prepared to argue that the strengths of one's resume and
one's moral fiber travel in lock-step.
I do not question the wisdom of merit selection as an alternative to elec-
tions. To the contrary, I am entirely persuaded by the Cecil B. DeMille cast
of commentators who have made a compelling case for merit-based judicial
selection as a means to improve the quality of the state bench.3 My only
point here is that the link between Justice Larsen's misconduct and the ab-
sence of a merit-based judicial selection system is a tenuous one.4
What the Larsen case does provide is a unique opportunity to re-analyze
the role that a shared separation of powers plays, or ought to play, in a repre-
sentative democracy. As discussed in part III, those who crafted the United
States Constitution were convinced of the need for shared power among the
branches to ensure that the independence created by a separation of powers
would not degenerate into unaccountability. 5 Thus, for example, regulating
judicial administration and procedure is to a significant extent within the con-
stitutional ambit of both the judiciary and the legislature.6 Similarly, the only
constitutional method for removing an Article III judge from office is by im-
peachment,7 in other words, by the action of a separate branch of
government.
In contrast, the Pennsylvania Constitution eschews shared power in
favor of extreme separation, conferring upon the judiciary almost exclusive
3. See, e.g., Montgomery & Conner, supra note 2, at 15-25; Bruce W. Kaufman, Judicial
Selection in Pennsylvania: A Proposal, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1163, 1174-77 (1982); Judicial Reform:
Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on Courts 5-34, 102-178 (Oct. 6, 1994)
[hereinafter Judicial Reform Oct. 6] (testimony of Fred Voight, Phyllis Beck, Carol Tracy, Leo
Levin, Larry Boaser, and Alex Bonavitacola); Judicial Reform: Hearings Before the House Judi-
ciary Comm. Subcomm. on Courts 54-134 (Nov. 18, 1994) [hereinafter Judicial Reform Nov. 18]
(testimony of Robert Beyer, Joseph Weis, Jr., and Guy Zoghby).
4. Montgomery and Conner implicitly acknowledge as much with the observation that
"[a]ilthough serious and disturbing, judicial misconduct is not the primary rationale for merit
selection." Montgomery & Conner, supra note 2, at 15.
5. See infra notes 80-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine under the United States Constitution.
6. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concurrent power of
the legislature and the judiciary in the regulation of the administration of the judiciary.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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control of court operations. 8 Consistent with that philosophy, until very re-
cently, two of the three methods of removing judges recognized by the Penn-
sylvania Constitution placed ultimate responsibility in the hands of its
supreme court,9 and the one that did not-impeachment'O-had not been
used since 1811.11
As argued in part IV, the Larsen case exposed two weaknesses inherent
in a tri-branch constitutional structure, such as Pennsylvania's, in which the
powers of government are insufficiently blended. 12 First, such a structure
adversely affects institutional accountability.' 3 Article V of the Pennsylvania
Constitution so insulated judicial administration and rule-making from legis-
lative scrutiny that nothing short of the constitutional crisis created by Justice
Larsen's impeachment prompted the Pennsylvania high court to implement
reforms, the absence of which had made Justice Larsen's misconduct possi-
ble. The appropriate solution is to amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to
give the General Assembly some form of shared responsibility with the judi-
ciary over judicial administration and rule-making, akin to that responsibility
given Congress under the United States Constitution.
Second, a constitutional structure that isolates the three branches of gov-
ernment adversely affects institutional credibility. 14 By its terms, the Penn-
sylvania Constitution gives the General Assembly a role to play in the
removal of judges through the impeachment process,15 and to that extent
blends the separate powers of the legislature and the judiciary. Prior to Jus-
tice Larsen's removal, however, the General Assembly had not exercised this
impeachment power in over 180 years, and its role in monitoring judicial con-
duct had been virtually non-existent. 16 Rather, to the extent judges were
disciplined or removed, it was by one of two other means provided for in the
state constitution, which, consistent with a constitutional vision of a judiciary
separate to the point of being isolated, made the supreme court the decision-
maker of last resort. These supreme court-dependent removal mechanisms
invite attacks on the judiciary's integrity and credibility, particularly when the
respondent is a supreme court justice: those members of the supreme court
8. See infra notes 105-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
9. There are two intra-judicial removal methods provided for by the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion: removal upon criminal conviction, PA. CONsT. art. V, § 18(d)(3); art. VI, § 7, and removal
upon recommendation of the Judicial Inquiry Review Board, PA. CONST. art. V, § 18.
10. PA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4-6.
11. Mark Hansen, Justice Impeached: Rolf Larsen Barred from Public Office, 80 A.B.A. J.
35, 35 (Dec. 1994).
12. See infra notes 170-242 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems which
arise from Pennsylvania's constitutional structure.
13. See infra notes 173-215 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of accounta-
bility that results from Pennsylvania's constitutional structure.
14. See infra notes 216-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of credibility
that results from Pennsylvania's constitutional structure.
15. PA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4-6.




who vote to remove can be accused of getting back at an enemy, while those
who vote not to remove can be charged with protecting a friend. In such
cases, impeachment by the House followed by conviction in the Senate re-
mains the most satisfactory removal mechanism, precisely because of the in-
termingled separation-of-powers balance it maintains.
II. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF JUSTICE ROLF LARSEN
He's like the (Energizer) bunny. He keeps going and going and
going while everybody keeps shooting at him.17
-Attorney William Costopoulos describing his client,
the Honorable Rolf Larsen
Rolf Larsen was elected to the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in
1973.18 Four years later, he won election to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.' 9 He wasted little time in attracting attention to himself. In Decem-
ber of 1980, press accounts linked him to an effort to organize a campaign
against the retention of fellow justice Robert Nix, who, by virtue of his sen-
iority, was the only justice standing between Larsen and the post of chief
justice. 20 The reports were particularly troubling in that Justice Larsen's pur-
ported strategy was to publicize, for the benefit of an uninformed electorate,
that Justice Nix was African American. 2 1 The Judicial Inquiry Review
Board ("JIRB")-a body empowered by the supreme court to investigate
claims of judicial misconduct and recommend sanctions for the supreme
court to impose 22-commenced an investigation into the allegations against
Justice Larsen.23
After a two-year investigation, the JIRB recommended no disciplinary
action against Justice Larsen. 24 Despite howls of protest from both press and
public, 25 Justice Larsen weathered the storm, won reelection to a second ten-
year term in 1987, and sued the state's two major newspapers for libel in
connection with their reporting of the JIRB proceedings. 26
On May 30, 1986, the year prior to his reelection, Justice Larsen met
with Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Judge Eunice Ross in her
chambers.27 At the time, Judge Ross was presiding over a matter that had
17. Quoted in Moushey, supra note 1, at Al.
18. XVII Senate of Pennsylvania, Senate Impeachment Trial Comm., In re Impeachment
Trial of Justice Rolf Larsen 3314, 3343 (Sept. 9, 1994) (testimony of Rolf Larsen).
19. Id.
20. See David Lauter, Pa. High Court in Turmoil: Justices Sidestep Misconduct Probe; Im-
peachment Rumors Abound, NAT'L L.J., June 27, 1983, at 1, 27-28, 32 (discussing charges against
Justice Larsen and describing newspaper accounts published by Pennsylvania press).
21. Id.
22. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(g), (h).
23. Lauter, supra note 20, at 1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 602 A.2d 324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
27. The events described in this paragraph are drawn from testimony taken before the
JIRB, which is summarized, with citations to the relevant testimony, in the JIRB's findings of
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taken a turn for the peculiar. She had been assigned to oversee administra-
tion of the estate of a man who had filed for bankruptcy shortly before he
died. When the assets of the estate were tallied, there appeared to be a
$500,000 shortfall. The administratrix of the estate moved the court to order
the decedent's bankruptcy counsel to return $17,500 he had disbursed for the
decedent prior to death. In opposing the motion, the bankruptcy counsel was
represented by his law partner, James Ashton, who was a friend of Justice
Larsen.28
According to Judge Ross, Justice Larsen broached the subject of this
pending motion in their May 30th meeting, advising Ross that two unidenti-
fied sources had informed him that another attorney, not the bankruptcy
counsel, had improperly taken money from the estate.29 Judge Ross did not
report the incident to the JIRB until the following year, after she learned that
Justice Larsen may have had a motive to do Ashton a favor by interceding on
behalf of Ashton's client.30 It was then, she said, that she read a newspaper
account of a favorable land purchase Justice Larsen had completed at Ash-
ton's instigation less than a week before her meeting with Justice Larsen the
previous year.31 The purchase in question concerned a thirty-six acre parcel
of land that Justice Larsen had acquired for $5,000 from Nikolai Zdrale, then
a client of Ashton's in a bankruptcy proceeding.32
Despite Justice Larsen's testimony that he met with Judge Ross for the
purpose of discussing complaints that others had made against her, and his
assertion that the matter of the estate never arose in their conversation,33 the
JIRB found that an improper ex parte contact had occurred. 34 Unconvinced,
however, that a "bad motive" existed for the contact, the JIRB limited its
recommended penalty to a public reprimand.35 The JIRB then submitted its
fact. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL INQUIRY REVIEW BOARD TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, IN RE: HON. ROLF LARSEN, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME
COURT, Part I, No. 140 JIRB Docket 1987 (Complaint Dkt. No. 87-156), at 5-15 (July 17, 1991)
[hereinafter "JIRB REPORT"].
28. Id.
29. Id. at 8; see also INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY REPORT No.1, IN RE: THE NINTH STATE-
WIDE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY, Dauphin County Common Pleas, No. 110 M.D. 1993,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 88 M.D. Misc. Docket 1992, Notice No. 9, at 9 (Oct. 22, 1993)
[hereinafter GRAND JURY REPORT]. The grand jury report was made public by order of the
court, after it was determined that Justice Larsen had disclosed his own grand jury testimony.
ORDER, IN RE: THE NINTH STATEWIDE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY, Dauphin County Com-
mon Pleas, No. 110 M.D. 1993, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 88 M.D. Misc. Docket 1992,
Notice No. 9 (Nov. 5, 1993).
30. JIRB REPORT, supra note 27, at 13-14.
31. Id. at 12-13.
32. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS TO THE JUDICIARY
COMM.: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CONDUCT OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ROLF LARSEN AU-
THORIZED BY HOUSE RESOLUTION 205 OF 1993, at 36 (May 6, 1994) [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT].
33. 21 Before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
In re: Docket No. 140, 2474, 2545-48 (Apr. 19, 1989) [hereinafter JIRB Transcript].
34. JIRB REPORT, supra note 27, at 93.
35. Id. at 95-96.
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recommendation to the supreme court, which adopted it on October 14,
1992, with Justices Cappy and Zappala voting in favor, a third justice dissent-
ing, and the remaining four not participating. 36
This article might have been considerably shorter and more pointless
had Justice Larsen simply endured the embarrassment of a public reprimand.
But he did not. On November 24, 1992, he filed a petition for recusal of
Justices Cappy and Zappala37-the two justices who had voted in favor of his
reprimand. In that petition, he made a series of remarkable allegations.
Some of the more inflammatory charges were (1) that Justice Zappala re-
ceived "indirect kickbacks" for assisting his brother's bond underwriting firm
by fixing cases in favor of the firm's municipal clients; 38 (2) that Justices
Cappy and Zappala sought (unsuccessfully) to have Nikolai Zdrale perjure
himself before the JIRB by recanting truthful prior testimony favorable to
Larsen concerning the land sale;39 and (3) that Justice Cappy sought to re-
verse Zdrale's attempted murder conviction in exchange for Zdrale recanting
his JIRB testimony in a statement to the Deputy Attorney General.40 On
December 14, 1992, Justice Larsen filed a supplemental petition for recusal in
which he added another allegation to the pile.4 ' It was a real humdinger:
that Justice Zappala had "commandeered" a car and tried to run over Justice
Larsen outside a Philadelphia hotel the previous week.42
In March 1993, a statewide grand jury convened to investigate Justice
Larsen's accusations against his brethren.43 Over the course of the eight-
month investigation, staff attorneys interviewed nearly 200 witnesses, of
whom twenty were called to testify.44 On October 22, 1993, the grand jury
issued an investigation report, which was made public on November 5.45 The
grand jury found "no credible evidence" to support any of the allegations in
36. In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 529 (Pa. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 65 (1993). See also
GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 29, at 11. Justice Papadakos dissented, and Justices Nix, Fla-
herty, and Larsen recused themselves. The seventh justice-Justice McDermott-died after oral
argument but before the final decision. Id.
37. Petition for Disqualification and Recusal of Justice Stephen A. Zappala and Justice
Ralph J. Cappy, In re: Hon. Rolf Larsen, Justice, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, No. 155 JIRB
Docket (Nov. 24, 1992).
38. Id. at 8-12.
39. Id. at 13-14. Zdrale testified before the JIRB that he was more than satisfied with the
terms of his sale of land to Justice Larsen, and that those terms were negotiated at arm's
length-testimony favorable to Larsen in that it undercut the suggestion that Larsen was so
indebted to Ashton for orchestrating the land sale as to have an improper motive for his meeting
with Ross. Id.
40. Id. at 24-32; GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 29, at 14-15.
41. Supplemental Petition for Disqualification and Recusal of Justice Stephen A. Zappala
and Justice Ralph J. Cappy, In re: Hon. Rolf Larsen, Justice, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, No.
155 JIRB Docket (Dec. 14, 1992).
42. Id. at 5-6.





Justice Larsen's petitions for recusal. 46 "To the contrary," concluded the
grand jury, "Justice Larsen made many of his allegations in bad faith and
with a reckless disregard of the truth. '47
In addition to the foregoing findings and conclusions, the grand jury in-
dicated that its investigation had yielded "information regarding conduct by
Justice Larsen and others that appropriately should be reported. '48 First, the
grand jury found that from the late 1970s through 1991, Justice Larsen "sys-
tematically maintained a list of allocatur petitions to be afforded special han-
dling."' 49 "Allocatur petitions," formally known as "petitions for allowance
of appeal," are the Pennsylvania equivalent of petitions for certiorari. 50 "The
cases on the list," found the grand jury, "often were being litigated by friends
and/or supporters of Justice Larsen. In every such case ... Justice Larsen
took some affirmative action to further the allocatur position being advo-
cated by his friend and/or supporter."'51 Second, the grand jury found that
from the early 1980s through 1993, Justice Larsen "obtained psychotropic
drugs through improper means," by causing "a physician to issue prescrip-
tions for tranquilizers and anti-depressants in the names of members of Jus-
tice Larsen's staff," who would then deliver the medications to Justice Larsen
for his own use.52
On October 29, 1993, one week after issuing its report, the grand jury
indicted Justice Larsen on sixteen counts of criminal conspiracy and viola-
tions of the Controlled Substances Act.53 Immediately thereafter, the
supreme court suspended him with pay.54 The case proceeded to a jury trial
in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and on April 9, 1994, the jury convicted
Justice Larsen on two felony counts of criminal conspiracy to violate the
Controlled Substances Act.55
During the preceding months, the General Assembly's interest in the
Larsen case had become increasingly keen. The House of Representatives
retained special counsel to advise it on impeachment and related matters. 56
In November 1993, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives adopted
House Resolution No. 205, authorizing its Judiciary Committee to investigate
46. Id. at 4-6.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id.
50. PA. R. APP. P. 1112-1123.
51. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 29, at 6.
52. Id. at 7.
53. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 32, at 51.
54. Frank Reeves, New Court Takes Up Larsen's Case: Suspension Would Halt Pay for
Justice Already Relieved of Duties on State High Court, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 24,
1994, at Dl.
55. House REPORT, supra note 32, at 51-52.
56. The House majority appointed John Moses, Esq., a private practitioner with his own
firm in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, to serve as special counsel, and I was called in later to assist
him. The House minority appointed Clayton Undercofler, Esq., as special counsel, with assist-
ance from David Moffitt, Esq., both of whom were private practitioners with Saul, Ewing, Rem-
ick and Saul in Philadelphia.
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the conduct of Justice Larsen to determine if the House should initiate im-
peachment proceedings. 57 On May 6, 1994, the House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Courts, chaired by Representative Frank Dermody, issued
a report on its investigation into Justice Larsen's conduct. 58 It concluded that
seven allegations of misconduct against Justice Larsen were serious enough
to constitute "misbehavior in office" (the standard by which the Pennsylvania
Constitution measured impeachable conduct) and were "supported by sub-
stantial evidence. 59
Accordingly, the Subcommittee urged the adoption of seven articles of
impeachment. Article I charged Justice Larsen with maintaining a special list
of allocatur petitions for the benefit of friends and contributors; Article II
singled out a pair of allocatur petitions on the special list that involved an
attorney who testified as to his ex parte conversations with Justice Larsen
concerning those petitions; Article III accused Justice Larsen of perjuring
himself before the grand jury by denying that the conversations described in
Article II took place; Article IV concerned the ex parte contact with Judge
Ross; Article V accused Justice Larsen of making reckless, unfounded allega-
tions against Justices Cappy and Zappala in his petitions for recusal; Article
VI concerned the drug charges; and Article VII was a catch-all, in which it
was alleged that the cumulative effect of Justice Larsen's misbehavior
brought the courts of the commonwealth into disrepute.60 On May 24, 1994,
the House of Representatives voted 199-0 to impeach Justice Larsen on the
seven enumerated articles.61
The JIRB, last heard from in 1991 when it recommended that Justice
Larsen be reprimanded for his ex parte contact with Judge Ross, passed from
the face of the Pennsylvania Constitution in May of 1993. Spurred by the
embarrassment created by Justice Larsen's escapades, 62 the constitution was
then amended to abolish the JIRB and establish an independent Judicial
Conduct Board within the judicial branch that reported not to the supreme
57. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 32, at 1.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2-3.
60. Id. at 3-5.
61. Bill Moushey, Larsen Removed; Senate Convicts on One Charge; Bans Him from Office,
PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE, Oct. 5, 1994, at Al.
62. The move to amend Pennsylvania's system of judicial discipline predated Justice Lar-
sen's second brush with the JIRB. Nevertheless, amid the final push to ratify the amendment,
the media certainly sought to link this reform to the Larsen case. A good example is an editorial
published by the Philadelphia Inquirer shortly after Larsen accused Justice Zappala of trying to
run him down in an automobile:
This increasingly bizarre controversy began when Justices Zappala and Cappy voted to
reprimand Justice Larsen .... [S]o for starters, the affair should serve as a driver's
manual for reforming the way judges are disciplined. A constitutional amendment
pending before the legislature would, among other things, prohibit Supreme Court jus-
tices from ruling on each other's conduct. Can there be any doubt at this point that
such a change is needed?




court, but to a Court of Judicial Discipline, comprised of judges, lawyers, and
laypeople.63 On March 12, 1994, the Judicial Conduct Board put a tentative
first foot forward by urging the Court of Judicial Discipline to suspend Justice
Larsen with pay pending the outcome of his criminal trial,64 an odd recom-
mendation since the supreme court had already suspended him. 65 On March
28, the Court of Judicial Discipline ruled against adopting the Board's recom-
mendation, 66 but revisited that ruling after Justice Larsen's drug conviction
and suspended him without pay.67 Three days later, the Judicial Conduct
Board officially charged Larsen with a range of misconduct that paralleled
the Articles of Impeachment; this initiated the process by which the Court of
Judicial Discipline could ultimately bring a range of sanctions to bear against
him, including removal from office.6 8
On June 13, 1994, two months after his conviction on drug charges, Alle-
gheny County Court of Common Pleas Judge W. Terrence O'Brien sentenced
Justice Larsen to probation and removal from office-the latter penalty be-
ing imposed pursuant to a little-used provision of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.69 Justice Larsen vowed to appeal, and later did. 70
Senator Stewart Greenleaf, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Senate's Spe-
cial Committee on Impeachment, expressed concern that Justice Larsen's
criminal conviction or sentence could be reversed on appeal, and therefore
saw no alternative to going forward with the impeachment trial. 71 Accord-
ingly, on August 8, the Special Committee heard opening arguments that be-
gan a five-week long evidentiary hearing.72 On October 4, after deliberating
for six hours, the Senate mustered the necessary two-thirds majority to con-
vict Justice Larsen and remove him from office on Article II: manipulating
two allocatur petitions in favor of an attorney and political contributor. 73
63. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18. See infra notes 232-42 and accompanying text for a more de-
tailed description of this disciplinary mechanism.
64. Reeves, supra note 54, at Dll.
65. See id. at Dll (noting that Larsen was suspended with pay immediately after his indict-
ment on criminal charges on October 29, 1993).
66. Jim Strader, Judicial Discipline Court Won't Suspend Larsen; First Official Ruling by
Body, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia), Mar. 29, 1994, at 3.
67. Frank Reeves, Larsen Salary Stopped Disciplinary Court Acts on Justice's Conviction,
PrrsaURGH POST-GAZETIrE, June 4, 1994, at B1.
68. Nick Jesdanun, Board Charges Larsen with Misconduct; Impeachment also Proceeds,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia), June 14, 1994, at Al.
69. Moushey, supra note 1, at Al. Article V, § 18(d) of the Pennsylvania Constitution pro-
vides that "[a] justice... convicted of misbehavior in office by a court ... shall forfeit automati-
cally his judicial office." PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(3). Article Vt, § 7, in turn, provides that
"[a]ll civil officers... shall be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous
crime." PA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
70. Hank Grezlak, RolfLarsen Appeals Criminal Conviction, PA. L. WKLY., Mar. 20, 1995,
at 11.
71. Moushey, supra note 1, at Al.
72. Nick Jesdanun, Little New Evidence in Larsen Trial; Senate Prosecutors Present Same
Arguments as Before, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia), Aug. 9, 1994, at 10.
73. Lisa Brennan & Hank Grezlak, Voting on Larsen Points Out Need for Systematic Re-
form, Bar Leaders Say, PA. L. WKLY., Oct. 10, 1994, at 24.
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The Senate acquitted Justice Larsen on all remaining articles, although a ma-
jority favored conviction on all but Articles I and VII.74
III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA AND
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS COMPARED
This is the first time ever that a citizen of the commonwealth has
been prosecuted by all three branches of government at the same
time.75
-William Costopoulos
In sorting through the rubble amid the after-shocks of Justice Larsen's
removal, there are a couple of chunks (to over-extend the metaphor) worthy
of particular attention. First, a system of judicial discipline in which the ulti-
mate disciplinary body is the court on which the miscreant judge sits inevita-
bly creates an apparent, if not a real, conflict of interest. The presence of so
obvious a potential conflict invites abuse of the sort described in Larsen im-
peachment Article V-a justice under investigation can seek to avoid disci-
plinary sanctions by targeting justices unsympathetic to his cause and
exaggerating the extent of their conflict of interest as a means to force their
disqualification. 76 Regardless of the success of the tactic, the impact of his
efforts on the integrity of the judiciary and the judicial process is significant
and deleterious.
Had the disciplinary system not sported the equivalent of a sign saying
"kick me," Justice Larsen would not have had reason to oblige by filing peti-
tions accusing his brethren of gross misconduct in an effort to disqualify
them. Had those petitions not been filed, the House and grand jury might
never have initiated an investigation; and had there been no investigation,
Justice Larsen's misconduct might never have been detected.
That gives rise to the second problem. In the minds of many, the most
serious charges against Justice Larsen included those in the first three Arti-
cles of Impeachment, which alleged that he manipulated the allocatur process
for the benefit of personal friends, and then denied having done so before the
grand jury, thereby perjuring himself.7 7 The task of detecting and proving
such misconduct was complicated by the internal operating procedures of the
supreme court, which enabled justices on the court to participate in the allo-
catur process, or not, in virtual anonymity. 78 The net effect was that a justice
74. The Impeachment Votes, PA. L. WKLY., Oct. 10, 1994, at 24.
75. Quoted in Megan O'Matz, House Votes To Impeach Larsen, 199-0, ALLENTOWN MORN-
INC CALL, May 25, 1994, at Al.
76. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 32, at 4-5 (noting that Article V charged Larsen with
making unfounded allegations against two justices who voted in favor of disciplinary charges
against him).
77. See id. at 3-4 (describing charges under first three Articles of Impeachment filed against
Larsen).
78. The supreme court has since revised its internal operating procedures to address a




could intercede on behalf of a friend representing a party in a case for which
allowance of appeal was sought, influence the outcome of the petition with-
out the public or the parties being aware, and then recuse himself from decid-
ing the appeal if the petition was granted. 79 Thus, only after the grand jury
initiated an investigation into an unrelated matter-the disqualification peti-
tions that Justice Larsen had filed against Justices Cappy and Zappala-did
Larsen's role with respect to a "special list" of allocatur petitions come to
light.
As luck would have it in this case, the presence of the first problem
avoided the second-in exploiting the vulnerability of the disciplinary pro-
cess by filing outlandish petitions for disqualification of his colleagues, Justice
Larsen attracted such attention to himself that his otherwise undetectable
allocatur practices were exposed. The linkage between these two problems,
however, is more than fortuitous. The roots of each are grounded in a state
constitutional vision of a judiciary separate to the point of being isolated, a
vision not shared by the federal constitution.
A. Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence Under the United States
Constitution
In The Federalist No. 47, James Madison responded to the criticism that
the proposed Constitution "violat[ed] ... the political maxim, that the legisla-
tive, executive and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct" 80
because it did not include an explicit separation-of-powers clause. Conceding
that "the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands ...may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyr-
anny,"'81 Madison remained firm in his conviction that "the emphatical and,
in some instances, the unqualified" separation-of-powers provisions included
in various state constitutions were neither necessary nor sufficient to avoid
over-concentrations of power.82 He viewed an express and absolute separa-
tion of powers as unnecessary, because the essential separation of functions
among the branches was already embedded in the structure of the first three
articles of the proposed Constitution.83 Moreover, explicit separation was
not sufficient, because unless the powers of the three branches "be so far
connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the
others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a
free government, can never in practice be duly maintained." 84
79. See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of the allocatur system
in place prior to the 1994 revisions.




84. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison). For a historical analysis of the flexible, in-
termingled separation of powers contemplated by the Constitution's framers, see Gerhard Cas-
per, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 211 (1989); John Gedid, History and Executive Removal Power: Morrison v. Olson and
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As it pertains to the relationship between Congress and the judiciary,
the text and structure of the Constitution reflect the interconnection and
blending of powers that Madison deemed essential to preventing any one
branch of government from gaining control over the others. One or both
houses of Congress are empowered to appropriate monies for court opera-
tions, 85 to confirm judicial nominees,86 to impeach and remove judges, 87 to
constitute the lower federal courts, 88 to regulate the Supreme Court's appel-
late jurisdiction,89 and to make laws necessary and proper for executing all
"[p]owers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."90 The judiciary, in turn, is
empowered to decide all cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of
the United States, and all controversies to which the United States is a
party.91
Congress, then, by virtue of its authority to establish the lower federal
courts and to make any law necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the judiciary's power to decide cases and controversies, may regulate judicial
operations and procedures.92 At the same time, the federal judiciary's ex-
press authority to decide cases and controversies at least arguably subsumes
the inherent authority to establish rules and procedures appropriate to decid-
ing these cases and controversies. 93 The extent of the Supreme Court's in-
herent rule making authority is an issue effectively mooted by the Rules
Enabling Act, which has delegated that authority to the judiciary by stat-
ute. 9 4 The net effect is, as one pair of commentators has put it, that "[flor
Separation of Powers, 11 CAMPBELL L. REV. 175 (1989); William Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of
the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (1989).
In Federalist Nos. 18-20, Hamilton and Madison criticized the Articles of Confederation by
comparing them to the failed efforts of other confederacies. In Federalist No. 20, for example,
the Belgic confederacy was described as maintaining a clear separation of powers among the
branches of government, "as delineated on parchment." In practice, however, they character-
ized the process as typified by "[imbecility in the government" and "discord among the prov-
inces." Meaningful separation of powers, in other words, required an elevation of substance
over form, which Hamilton and Madison thought the proposed Constitution achieved and the
Articles of Confederation did not. THE FEDERALiST No. 20 (James Madison & Alexander
Hamilton).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
86. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
87. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
88. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
89. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
90. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
91. Id. art. III, § 2.
92. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text for a summary of Congress's enumerated
powers over the judiciary.
93. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1021 n.
19, 1114-16 (1982); A. Leo Levin & Anthony Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-
Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1958); Roscoe Pound,
The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 601 (1926).
94. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994). The Rules Enabling Act empowers the Supreme and
lower courts to "prescribe rules for the conduct of their business," provided that such rules are
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decades, if not for centuries, control over [court] practice and procedure has
been the subject of a concurrent jurisdiction. '95
Madison's vision of blended powers as a means to keep the branches of
government in check is alive and well in the concurrent jurisdiction of the
judiciary and Congress over judicial administration. The judiciary is acutely
aware that if it promulgates rules, it must do so with care and political sensi-
tivity, lest it invite Congressional intercession-for better or worse.96  The
judiciary is equally aware that if it does not promulgate rules, Congress may
jump into the breach-again, for better or worse.97 Judge Patrick Higginbot-
ham, Chairman of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, underscored the point in a recent interview:
The federal rules are the legitimate concern of Congress and the
courts. The procedures for notice, comment, meticulous drafting,
and review that produce high quality rule amendments as contem-
plated by the Rules Enabling Act have usually persuaded Congress
to resist direct amendment and to listen to the judges and lawyers
who work daily with the real world of the rules. We, in turn, must
listen and consider.98
"consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section
2072." 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a). Section 2072, in turn, authorizes the Court to promulgate "rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence," 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), and further provides that
"[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have
taken effect," 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Congress, on the other hand, is afforded a seven-month win-
dow period between the time that the Supreme Court recommends a rule change and the effec-
tive date of that change within which to modify or reject the proposed rule. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a).
95. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 93, at 3.
96. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Asser-
tions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 2067, 2079-82 (1989). Professor Carrington, then Reporter to the Judicial Conference Ad-
visory Committee on the Civil Rules, argued that judiciary is best equipped to promulgate rules
that are trans-substantive, i.e. general in their applicability and politically neutral, in part be-
cause such rules are less likely to invite Congressional interference.
97. The Civil Justice Reform Act furnishes a useful illustration. Senator Joseph Biden in-
troduced legislation to rectify what he perceived to be the judiciary's failure to manage civil
litigation aggressively enough. Federal Courts Study Comm. Implementation Act and Civil Justice
Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administra-
tion of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 597-601 (1990). The
judiciary responded with howls of protest, arguing, among other things, that the matters the
legislation sought to regulate were better addressed by judiciary-adopted rules pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act. Id. at 109, 378-91, 417-26, 431-36 (letters and commentary from various
federal judges in opposition to the act). In an attempt to dampen the ardor for legislative re-
form, the Judicial Conference announced that it was implementing its own 14-point plan that
embodied the essence of the Civil Justice Reform Act. Id. at 103-08. The Senate Judiciary
Committee Report quoted from the testimony of a witness in explaining the need for legislation,
despite the judiciary's 14-point plan: " '[T]he objectives of this bill could be achieved without
legislation .... The question is will they be, and regrettably, I do not think they will be without this
sort of catalytic push to it.' " Id. at 31.




The role played by intermingled powers is equally obvious in the area of
judicial removal. Impeachment by the House and removal from office upon
conviction by the Senate is the only mechanism the United States Constitu-
tion provides for removal of Article III judges.99 Although the constitution-
ality of intra-judicial and other methods of removal is sometimes
discussed, 100 the discussion will likely remain theoretical, as long as impeach-
ment continues to be accepted as a viable (if cumbersome) means of re-
moval.' 0 ' To date, the House of Representatives has undertaken fifty-eight
impeachment investigations and impeached thirteen judges, three in the past
decade alone.'02 Of those investigated but not impeached, twenty obviated
the need for impeachment proceedings by resigning.10 3 Of the thirteen
judges impeached, the Senate convicted and removed seven, acquitted four,
and two resigned before trial.'0 4 In short, as with judicial administration and
rule-making, the role of the legislature in judicial removal has been and re-
mains significant in the federal system.
B. Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence Under the Pennsylvania
Constitution
Many state systems, like the federal one, provide for an intermingled
separation of powers that gives the judiciary less than exclusive control over
court procedure and practice.' 05 Not so the Pennsylvania Constitution, as
interpreted by its supreme court. 10 6 Article II of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion does not itemize and thereby limit the powers of the legislature, as does
its federal counterpart. 0 7 Rather, it states only that "[t]he legislative power
of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly.' 0 8 Accord-
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
100. On a theoretical plane, the debate continues as to whether other methods of removal
might be consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CON-
sTrrIUTIONAL PROBLEMS 122-37, 181 (1973) (arguing that certain common law removal mecha-
nisms are constitutional); Peter Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A
Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 239 (1993) (discussing whether intra-judicial
removal would be constitutional).
101. See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the viability of
impeachment.
102. Warren Grimes, The Role of the United States House of Representatives in Proceedings
To Impeach and Remove Federal Judges, I RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 44-46, 117-33 (1993).
103. Id.
104. Emily F. Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service-
and Disservice-1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 336 n.14 (1993).
105. Harry Witte, Judicial Selection in the People's Democratic Republic of Pennsylvania:
Here The People Rule?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1079, 1145-46 (1995).
106. See In re 42 PA. C.S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 448 (Pa. 1978) (explaining how Penn-
sylvania Constitution provides that judiciary retains full control over establishing procedure and
practice rules).
107. Ruano v. Barbieri, 400 A.2d 235, 239 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (explaining that, unlike
Congress, whose powers are specified and therefore limited, General Assembly has jurisdiction
over all matters not otherwise prohibited by constitution).
108. PA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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ingly, this section has been interpreted to confer upon the General Assembly
all powers of a legislative character that some other provision of the constitu-
tion does not otherwise remove from its purview.10 9
Article V, section 10(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that "[t]he Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory
and administrative authority over all the courts." 110 Section 10(c), in turn,
states:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts . . . in-
cluding the power to provide for ... admission to the bar and to
practice law, and the administration of all courts and supervision of
all officers of the judicial branch, if such rules are consistent with
this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the sub-
stantive rights of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General
Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court .... All laws
shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules
prescribed under these provisions."' 1
Confining oneself to the text of the constitution, article V, section 10
arguably says no more than that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's power to
regulate court operations is concurrent with that of the General Assembly.
Creating rules of general applicability to litigants and courts across the com-
monwealth is a task legislative in character and therefore within the ambit of
the plenary legislative power conferred upon the General Assembly under
article II, unless article V takes that power away.112 The last clause of article
V, section 10(c) clearly implies that the General Assembly retains law-mak-
ing power over court practice, procedure, and conduct. If "[a]ll laws shall be
suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under
these provisions,"'1 13 the unavoidable corollary is that legislation consistent
with such rules is valid and proper. 114
As to the suspension of laws inconsistent with court rules, the question
becomes whether a court-promulgated rule preempts inconsistent legislation
enacted before and after the rule's adoption, or merely supersedes prior leg-
islation that is inconsistent with a subsequently adopted rule. In the federal
system, a comparably-worded statutory provision has been given the latter
interpretation-meaning that when the Supreme Court promulgates a rule, it
109. Kotch v. Middle Coal Field Poor Dist., 197 A. 334, 338 (Pa. 1938); Ruano, 400 A.2d at
239. See also Luzerne County v. Morgan, 107 A. 17, 17 (Pa. 1919) (explaining that legislature
may do whatever it is not expressly forbidden to do by state or federal constitutions).
110. PA. CONsT. art. V, § 10(a).
111. Id. art. V, § 10(c).
112. See, e.g., Ruano, 400 A.2d at 239 (holding that General Assembly could assign senior
judges since article V of Pennsylvania Constitution does not prohibit such action).
113. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
114. Bruce Ledewitz, What's Really Wrong with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 32
Duo. L. REV. 409, 413-14 (1994).
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supersedes prior inconsistent legislation but does not affect the legislature's
power to enact a new statute reinstating the earlier legislation. 115
Courts construing Pennsylvania's article V, however, have interpreted
section 10(c) to confer upon the judiciary the sole power to regulate its af-
fairs. In Garrett v. Bamford,116 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit interpreted section 10(c) to mean that "the state's supreme
court [has] exclusive power to establish rules of procedure for state courts;
although the legislature makes substantive law, it is without power to control
procedure."' 17 The court failed to support its interpretation with anything
more than a citation to section 10(c) itself, and made no attempt to reconcile
its edict with the text of that section, which at the very least would seem to
give the legislature concurrent power to make procedural law that is consis-
tent with supreme court rules.
In a 1978 letter of address to the governor and General Assembly, cap-
tioned In re 42 Pa. C.S. § 1703,118 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying
in part upon the Third Circuit's opinion in Garrett, declared that the state's
public meeting law was unconstitutional as applied to the judiciary.119 The
high court deemed the law, which would have prohibited the court from con-
ducting its rule-making meetings behind closed doors, "inconsistent with the
Pennsylvania Constitution's grant of Power to the Supreme Court 'to pre-
scribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all
courts' " within the meaning of section 10(c).' 20 "Notwithstanding the ex-
plicit language of Article V, § 10(c)," the court reasoned, "[i]t could be ar-
gued that . . . [the grant of rule-making authority to the judiciary] is not
exclusive and allows the General Assembly to exercise concurrent power in
the area.' 121 The court rejected that argument in light of section 61 of title
17 of the Pennsylvania Statutes, a repealed statute that had been the "prede-
cessor statute" to section 10(c).' 22 That statute provided, in relevant part,
that "[flrom and after the effective date of any rule promulgated under this
Section . . [.] the operation of any act of Assembly relating to practice or
procedure ... and inconsistent with such rule, shall be suspended insofar as
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1990). The Rules Enabling Act provides that "[a]ll laws in con-
flict with such rules [promulgated by the Supreme Court] shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect." Id. A primary goal of this clause is, as one scholar has put it,
"to provide a means by which the rule-making process can clear away from the timbers of impor-
tant and enduring federal legislation the undergrowth of procedural marginalia that may have
been attached to legislation for faded or forgotten reasons." Paul D. Carrington, "Substance"
and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DuKE L.J. 281, 324. It imposes no restrictions
upon legislation passed subsequent to the promulgation of a rule. JAMES MOORE, MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1:02[5] (1994).
116. 582 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1978).
117. Id. at 814 (citing PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c)).
118. 394 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1978).
119. Id. at 448.
120. Id. at 446.




such act may be inconsistent with such rule."'1 23 The court reasoned that,
given the "broad scope of authority" that this statute delegated to the
supreme court, "it would be anomalous to conclude that Section 10(c) is
nothing more than a grant of concurrent power."'1 24
It would, of course, not be anomalous at all. The predecessor statute
quite clearly stated that inconsistent legislation was invalid "from and after
the effective date of any rule promulgated under this section."'125 In other
words, the statute did more than merely supersede prior inconsistent legisla-
tion; it explicitly preempted subsequent inconsistent legislation as well. The
fact that section 10(c) dropped the forward-looking language of its "prede-
cessor statute" lends credence to the view that what remains is merely a su-
persession clause, like its counterpart in federal law.
As cursory and unsatisfactory as the supreme court's analysis may have
been, the result it reached is supported, albeit inconclusively, by the history
underlying the adoption of section 10. In 1963, the Pennsylvania Bar Associa-
tion published Project Constitution, a report that included proposed text for a
new constitution. 126 Section 12 of the judiciary article, as drafted by the
Pennsylvania Bar Association, provided in relevant part that
(a) The Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory and ad-
ministrative authority over all the courts of this Commonwealth
(b) The Supreme Court shall have power to prescribe Rules in all
civil and criminal actions and proceedings for all courts, governing
administration, practice and procedure .... These rules shall have
the force and effect of law and shall suspend all statutes inconsistent
therewith. 127
Comparing this text to that of section 10 gets us only so far. Section 10
appears to narrow the rule-making power contemplated in section 12 by
prohibiting court rules affecting substantive rights and at the same time to
broaden it by providing that supreme court rules shall invalidate all "laws,"
not just "statutes" as was contemplated by its section 12 predecessor. Other-
wise, section 12 is no less delphic than its section 10 progeny on the critical
questions of whether the supreme court's self-administration powers are ex-
clusive and whether rules invalidate inconsistent prior laws only, or inconsis-
tent future laws as well.
Looking beyond the text of section 12 to the report of the bar subcom-
mittee responsible for drafting it is unhelpful. The subcommittee did not see
123. Id. at 447 (quoting 17 P.S. § 61 (1937) (repealed in part 1978)).
124. Id. at 448.
125. 17 P.S. § 61, repealed in part by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1722 (1978) (emphasis added).
126. Project Constitution, 34 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 147 (1963).
127. Id. at 195 (quoting Pennsylvania Bar Association Standing Committee on Constitu-
tional Law, Resolution No. 105).
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fit to elaborate upon its intentions, declaring somewhat smugly that "[t]o
judges and lawyers, the provisions speak for themselves. ' 128 Yeah, right.
As the Constitutional Convention drew closer, a preparatory committee
of legislators developed a series of background manuals for the benefit of
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, including Manual No. 5, con-
cerning the judiciary. 129 The committee found "increasing support of auton-
omy in court administration"'130 and identified organizations, such as the
Conference of Chief Justices, that "have begun to double their efforts at
thwarting non-judicial control of judicial administration.' 131 Referring to the
statute discussed by the supreme court in In re 42 Pa. C.S. § 1703,132 the
committee noted that "[tihe basic structure for complete self-administration
of the courts is already established in the rule-making powers of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court,"'1 33 but added that such powers "may be overruled
by legislative enactment."'1 34 To "obviate future squabbles between the judi-
ciary and the legislative and executive branches,"'1 35 the committee called
upon the delegates to consider a proposal of the Maryland Constitutional
Convention Commission, which provided that " 'the Supreme Court and the
General Assembly are to have concurrent power to prescribe regulations
governing administration of the courts,' "but that" 'in the event of a conflict
between a law and a Supreme Court rule, the latter is to prevail as to the
conflict if the rule is readopted after the law.' "136
That the Convention did not act on the preparatory committee's propo-
sal cuts both ways. On the one hand, the Convention did not adopt an ex-
plicit power-sharing arrangement between the judiciary and the General
Assembly on matters of court administration, suggesting the possibility that
none was contemplated. On the other hand, the preparatory committee in-
vited the Convention to adopt a provision expressly empowering the
supreme court to promulgate rules trumping past and future legislation, an
invitation the Convention effectively declined, implying that the Convention
may not have wished to confer such power on the judiciary.
128. Id. at 284 (quoting PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMM. ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, INTERIM REPORT OF COMM. No. 6 ON THE JUDICIARY, INCLUDING THE MINOR
JUDICIARY).
129. THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, THE JUDICIARY: REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5 (1967-
1968) (background manual for delegates to Constitutional Convention).
130. Id. at 222.
131. Id. The Committee explained that the Conference on Chief Justices adopted a resolu-
tion which would ensure judicial independence over such areas as regulation of expenditures,
supervision of employees, and the hiring and firing of employees.
132. 394 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1978).
133. THE PREPARATORY COMMITEE, supra note 129, at 222 n.37. See supra notes 118-24
and accompanying text for a discussion of In re Pa. C.S. § 1703.
134. THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, supra note 129, at 222.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 223 (quoting INTERIM REPORT OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION COMMISSION 138 (1967)).
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At the Convention itself, the language of section 10(c) was passed as it
was introduced. 137 Delegate Gustave Amsterdam offered the following gloss
on this section in his summary of article V to the Convention: "This [section]
is intended to clearly indicate that the Supreme Court is not a legislative
body, is not to make substantive rights, but is to be charged with full respon-
sibility for the proper administration and supervision of the entire judicial
administration in the commonwealth."'1 38 If section 10(c) was understood to
give the supreme court "full responsibility" to administer the courts, it under-
cuts the suggestion that the judiciary was to share such responsibility with the
General Assembly.
On the other hand, amendments to other sections of article V, as intro-
duced, counsel against racing to the conclusion that the convention delegates
thought that they were giving the supreme court exclusive power over admin-
istration and rule-making. For example, section 1(b) of article V originally
provided that "the jurisdiction and powers presently vested in the courts of
this Commonwealth shall be vested in the unified judicial system created
hereby and the General Assembly shall not remove any of said jurisdiction or
powers from said system or any part thereof without prior approval of the
Supreme Court."'1 39 This language was deleted by amendment during the
Constitutional Convention. 140 As explained by one of the amendment's pro-
ponents, "what we are trying to abolish by this amendment, is the veto power
of a judicial body over a legislature, which is contrary to Federal history and
all of our history.' 141 Similarly, the Convention later deleted the phrase
"with the advice and consent of the Supreme Court," from section 9,142
which originally read that "the General Assembly may, with the advice and
consent of the Supreme Court, establish such courts, or divisions of existing
courts, as may be needed, or, with the advice and consent of the Supreme
Court, abolish any court, or division thereof, created by statute."'143 The ex-
planation offered for the amendment was to "parallel th[e] idea" reflected in
the amendment to section 1(b). 144
To the extent the 1968 Convention was unwilling to confer upon the
supreme court the power to frustrate the will of the General Assembly in
sections 1 and 9, one might suppose that it would be equally unwilling to do
so in section 10. Or maybe not. The debates on the amendments to sections
1 and 9 reveal that the Convention was primarily concerned with preserving
the General Assembly's power to enlarge or restrict the judiciary's subject
137. Compare Original Proposal No. 7, § 17(c), in 1 DEBATES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967-1968 448 (1969) [hereinafter DEBATES] and PA. CONST. art.
V, § 10(c).
138. 2 DEBATES, supra note 137, at 837.
139. 1 id. at 445.
140. 2 id. at 874.
141. 1 id. at 377.
142. Id. at 946-47.
143. Id. at 445.
144. 2 id. at 946.
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matter jurisdiction. 145 A sponsor of the section 1 amendment characterized
that power as "an integral part of an act of the legislature" whenever reme-
dial legislation is enacted; consequently, the sponsor thought it "absolutely
essential that the Supreme Court not be given a veto power over such reme-
dial legislation." 146
Delegate David Barron offered an amendment to section 18 that would
delete the same language he had succeeded in deleting in his amendment to
section 9.147 The Convention rejected the section 18 amendment overwhelm-
ingly.148 Section 18 provided that "[t]he number and boundaries of judicial
districts shall be changed by the General Assembly only with the advice and
consent of the Supreme Court. ' 149 Unlike sections 1 and 9, which would
have given the supreme court joint authority over matters the Convention
considered of primary interest to the General Assembly, section 18 was seen
as relating to matters of mutual interest to the judiciary and the General
Assembly. As delegate and former governor William Scranton put it in op-
posing the section 18 amendment:
[T]his is both a financial and an administrative function, and that is
precisely why we put both groups into it, the Legislature and the
Supreme Court. The Legislature should have jurisdiction concern-
ing judicial districts, because they partly pay for same.. . and ... the
Supreme Court under the new unified system for the first time in
Pennsylvania has the responsibility for the administration of same
150
Delegate John Hannum echoed the sentiments of Governor Scranton: "I
voted for the Barron amendment, the first one we passed, because ... this
was an encroachment on the legislative function .... I concur in the view of
Governor Scranton with respect to the second proposal, that this is an admin-
istrative function and not an encroachment on the legislative function.' 151
Implicit in the comments of Governor Scranton and Delegate Hannum is the
assumption that the courts' administrative functions fall within the purview
of the supreme court and not the General Assembly-an assumption consis-
tent with Delegate Amsterdam's characterization of section 10 as conferring
"full responsibility" upon the supreme court for "proper administration and
supervision" of the judiciary. 152
Even if the delegates did indeed believe that the General Assembly had
no legitimate role to play in overseeing the court's rule-making and adminis-
145. See id. at 877 (delegates noting importance of not infringing upon legislature's prerog-
atives in amending section 1); 1 id. at 946 (Delegate Barron expressing belief that General As-
sembly should be empowered to remove same jurisdiction it created).
146. 2 id. at 477.
147. Id. at 947.
148. Id. at 949.
149. 1 id. at 448.
150. 2 id. at 947.
151. Id. at 948.
152. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Delegate Amster-
dam's comments regarding § 10(c) of article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
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trative functions, they could not have foreseen the full extent of the powers
they had ceded to the judiciary. It should be unsurprising to all except the
hopelessly naive that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would resolve a con-
stitutional power struggle between itself and the General Assembly in favor
of itself, particularly when the Convention debates lend support to the
court's interpretation (never mind that the court did not rely on the Conven-
tion debates in deciding the issue). What is refreshing, if not surprising, is the
reach and vigor of that power grab. Painting in the broadest of strokes, the
In re 42 Pa. C.S. § 1703 court declared that "once it becomes clear-as it
surely is now-that the rule-making power is vested by the Constitution in
the judiciary, any legislative intrusion into that power must be viewed with
the greatest of skepticism.' 153 The court dismissed the possibility that such
an approach was inconsistent with separation-of-powers principles by observ-
ing that "the existence of appropriate overlap between branches with respect
to some functions of government does not mean that such overlap is appro-
priate with respect to all functions."' 154
The Pennsylvania judiciary wasted no time in exploiting its recently dis-
covered power over the General Assembly. In 1981, the commonwealth
court did not even acknowledge the existence of "appropriate overlap be-
tween the branches," positing instead that "the functions of the several parts
of government are thoroughly separated. '' 15s Accordingly, the court held the
Public Employee Relations Act unconstitutional to the extent that it imposed
any limits on the power of the judiciary to discharge its employees, a power
that "may not, consistent with the Constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers, be policed, encroached upon or diminished by another branch of
government."'1 56
In 1983, the supreme court expanded the scope of its exclusive power
over rule-making to reach all matters relating to judicial operations. 157 As
the court expansively put it, "[legislation that infringes on this Court's au-
thority over courts is invalid.' 58 Accordingly, the court deemed the Ethics
Act,159 which obligated public officials from all three branches of govern-
ment to make certain disclosures with respect to their finances, unconstitu-
tional as it applied to the judiciary.' 60 The following year, the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas expanded the judiciary's power in another direction,
ruling that its "exclusive power to regulate practice and procedure .. in-
153. In re 42 Pa. C.S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 448 (Pa. 1978).
154. Id. at 451.
155. Beckert v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 425 A.2d 859, 862
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981), affd, 459 A.2d 756 (Pa. 1983).
156. Id.
157. See Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n, 469 A.2d 593, 595-96 (Pa. 1983) (holding that
financial disclosure provisions of the Ethics Act, insofar as they applied to judges, infringe upon
supreme court's power to supervise courts and are thus unconstitutional).
158. Id. at 595.
159. Act of Oct. 4, 1978, Pub. L. 883, No. 170 (codified at 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 401-
413 (1995)).
160. Kremer, 469 A.2d at 595-96.
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clud[ed] matters of evidentiary law."'161 The court thus declared unconstitu-
tional a statute that redefined the insanity defense and reallocated burdens of
proof among the parties.162 And in 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
struck down a statute that forbade attorneys from entering into contingency
fee contracts within fifteen days of a client's release from a hospital, on the
grounds that the judiciary had the exclusive power to regulate the practice of
law.163
Until very recently, the walls of separation protecting the supreme
court's exclusive domain over procedural rule-making and judicial adminis-
tration extended, for all practical purposes, to judicial removal as well.
Granted, the Pennsylvania Constitution had always empowered the General
Assembly to impeach, try, and convict judicial officers, but it was a power
that, as a matter of custom, the General Assembly simply did not exercise. In
the 183 years preceding Justice Larsen's impeachment, the House impeached
no one, and none of the nine investigations into judicial misconduct con-
ducted during that time culminated in a committee recommendation to the
House as a whole that impeachment charges be filed.164
Moreover, prior to the 1993 constitutional amendment, 65 the remaining
two methods by which a supreme court justice could be removed from office
conferred ultimate removal authority upon the supreme court. The supreme
court appointed the JIRB, and JIRB recommendations were merely preca-
tory; the power to remove, discipline, or do nothing remained with the
supreme court.166 Similarly, the power to remove a judge upon criminal con-
viction was and remains within the ultimate control of the supreme court.167
Although the text of the constitution does not make imposition of the sen-
tence discretionary with the court-a judge "shall forfeit automatically his
161. Commonwealth v. Kidney, No. 2318-33, 1984 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 75, at *20 (Pa.
C.P. May 29, 1984). The court in Kidney based its ruling on article V, § 10(c) of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, encompassing the doctrine of separation of powers, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Id.
162. Id. at *18.
163. Lloyd v. Fishinger, 605 A.2d 1193, 1195 (Pa. 1992).
164. ROBERT WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTIUTIONAL LAW 364-67 (1985). In three of
the nine cases that Judge Woodside discusses, the Judiciary Committee recommended against
impeachment proceedings without appointing a subcommittee or requesting the appointment of
a special committee. In four other cases, the Judiciary Committee called for the appointment of
a special investigating committee; three of those four committees recommended against im-
peachment of the judge under investigation, while the fourth was unable to complete its work
before the close of the legislative session. In the remaining two cases, the Judiciary Committee
appointed a subcommittee to investigate: in one of those cases the Committee adopted its sub-
committee's recommendation against impeachment; in the other, the Committee rejected its
subcommittee's recommendation that impeachment charges be filed.
165. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of this amendment
to the constitution.
166. PA. CONsT. art. V, § 18(g), (h).
167. See id. art. V, § 18(d) (providing for removal of justice, judge, or justice of the peace
upon conviction of certain crimes).
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judicial office" if convicted of "misbehavior in office"168-the scope of "mis-
behavior in office" is the judiciary's, and in the end the supreme court's, to
define and impose as it sees fit. 169
IV. THE DECLINE AND FALL REVISITED: THREATS TO ACCOUNTABILITY
AND CREDIBILITY, AND THE NEED FOR A BLENDED
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Having delineated the considerable extent to which the Pennsylvania
Constitution isolates its judiciary from the other branches of government, it
becomes possible to link such isolation to the two problems previously identi-
fied in connection with the Larsen case: first, that the misconduct for which
the General Assembly impeached and removed Justice Larsen might well
have gone undetected, had he not contested his reprimand by filing petitions
to disqualify Justices Cappy and Zappala from deciding the matter; and sec-
ond, that Justice Larsen had an obvious incentive to file such petitions as a
means to exploit the inevitable conflict of interest created by his supreme
court colleagues deciding whether and to what extent he should be disci-
plined for alleged misconduct. 170 As argued in part A, the first problem is
attributable, at least in part, to an under-regulated supreme court-an inevi-
table by-product of a constitutional structure in which the judiciary is isolated
to the point of being unaccountable. 171 As argued in part B, the second
problem results from a system of judicial discipline in which the supreme
court polices and removes its own, a responsibility that invites attacks on the
court's credibility and which again is grounded in a constitutional vision of a
judiciary isolated and accountable to no one but itself.172
A. Accountability and Judicial Self-Administration
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged that it alone is ac-
countable for the rules and procedures that it alone has the power to imple-
168. Id. art. V, § 18(d)(3). Article VI, § 7 does not use the term "automatically" but is
stated in equally non-discretionary terms: "All civil officers... shall be removed on conviction of
misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime." Id. art. VI, § 7.
169. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not shied away from putting its own interpretive
gloss on the meaning of "misbehavior in office." See, e.g., In re Scott, 596 A.2d 150, 151 (Pa.
1991) (holding that trial record was insufficient to sustain determination that District Judge had
been convicted of "misbehavior in office" warranting automatic forfeiture of judicial office, but
did demonstrate that removal on other grounds was warranted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 129
(1993); In re Braig, 590 A.2d 284, 287-89 (Pa. 1991) (holding that judge's conviction of mail fraud
for submitting claim on homeowner's insurance policy was not conviction for "misbehavior in
office" which triggered automatic forfeiture of judicial office under constitutional provision).
170. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text for a summary of the two major
problems which result from the extreme separation of powers created by the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
171. See infra notes 173-215 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems which
arise from the lack of accountability under this governmental system.
172. See infra notes 216-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems which
arise from the lack of credibility inherent in this governmental system.
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ment: "The sole responsibility for the administration of the judicial system
and all the procedural problems inherent therein devolves upon this Court.
Consequently, it is not the legislators who are held accountable by the public
for the efficient and orderly administration of the courts, but the judiciary
itself."'1 73 As inspiring as it may be to witness a branch of government take
responsibility for its actions by declaring that the buck stops with it, talk is
cheap-particularly where, as here, the public has no real means by which to
hold the judiciary accountable for its irresponsible administration of the
courts, short of amending the constitution.' 74
As an initial matter, judges and justices come up for reelection but once
a decade. 175 When they do, they must run unopposed.' 76 Moreover, the
public has no role to play in filling a vacancy created by a vote of no confi-
dence, 177 meaning that the rational voter should cast her ballot against a
judge's retention only if the judge is so incompetent that anyone the gover-
nor might appoint as a replacement would have to be an improvement.
None but the most grimly determined of voters can therefore be ex-
pected to exercise her decennial right to hold a judge accountable by assess-
ing the judge's record as an administrator and casting her ballot against
retention if that record proves wanting. Even .among the few willing to do
what it takes to hold a judge accountable for administrative mismanagement,
none can do so intelligently. Unlike the federal system, where the Judicial
Conference is required by statute to make its rule-making proceedings open
to the public, 178 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court makes rules behind closed
doors and has invalidated legislative efforts to open them.' 79 Moreover, to
the extent that the supreme court does not bother to publish the rules it
promulgates in closed-door sessions,180 the public has no basis upon which to
assess the court's administrative performance. As former Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Justice Bruce Kaufman pointedly observed: "[T]he evidence
overwhelmingly suggests that judges are elected in a climate of nearly total
voter ignorance.' 18 1
173. Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 436 A.2d 147, 152 (Pa. 1981) (citing Levin & Amsterdam,
supra note 93, at 10), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bucheit v. Laudenberger, 456 U.S. 940 (1982).
174. For a concise and convincing argument that Pennsylvania's system of judicial elections
does not adequately foster accountability, see Montgomery & Conner, supra note 2, at 18-21.
175. PA. CONST. art. V, § 15(a).
176. Id. art. V, § 15(b).
177. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, it is the governor who fills judicial vacancies,
with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the members of the Senate. Id. art. V, § 13.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1) (1988) (providing that each meeting of Judicial Conference
rules committee "shall be open to the public," except under specified circumstances, and further
providing that "[m]inutes of each meeting... shall be maintained by the committee and made
available to the public").
179. In re 42 Pa. C.S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 448 (Pa. 1978).
180. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's failure to
publish the rules regarding allocatur petitions.
181. Bruce Kaufman, Judicial Selection in Pennsylvania:, A Proposal, 27 VILL L. REv. 1163,
1166-67 (1982); see also Montgomery & Conner, supra note 2, at 21.
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In the federal system, where judges are appointed for life, accountability
for judicial rule-making and administration derives from the concurrent juris-
diction of Congress over such matters. 182 The price the judiciary must pay
for its autonomy is competent, responsive, and politically sensitive decision-
making.183 This is not to say that Congress is forever breathing down the
neck of the third branch. To the contrary, matters of judicial rule-making and
administration are, for the most part, sufficiently esoteric, arid, and lacking in
political profile that legislators have little incentive to get involved, unless
and until there is a groundswell of complaints by constituents or others signi-
fying the existence of a potential problem. 184 The point remains, however,
that the federal judiciary-unlike its Pennsylvania counterpart-is ultimately
accountable for its procedural and administrative decision-making.
The federal judiciary thus has a significant incentive to consider carefully
responsible calls for court reform. In 1988, for example, Congress created
the Federal Courts Study Committee, comprised of representatives from all
three branches of government and charged with the task of recommending
reforms that would better equip the judiciary to cope with docket congestion
and other long-term problems.185 The Committee made many recommenda-
tions, including thirty-seven that the judiciary could implement without en-
abling legislation. 186 Within a year after the Committee published its report,
the Judicial Conference had taken a position on at least twenty of those rec-
ommendations, approving sixteen and rejecting only four.187 The Con-
182. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress's concurrent
jurisdiction.
183. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of Con-
gress's concurrent jurisdiction on the judiciary.
184. See Charles G. Geyh, Mass Tort Litigation and the Politics of Reform, 10 REV. LiM.
401, 403-04 (1991) (identifying litigation reform issues as "incomprehensible and dreary for the
average member of Congress," arguing that "[a]s long as complex-litigation reform maintains a
low political profile, and pressure to pass legislation of some sort is therefore limited, the most
likely outcome-in the absence of a consensus as to how best to proceed-will be in a decision
not to move forward, for want of time, interest, and expertise"). I say "for the most part" be-
cause Congress has taken a renewed interest in judicial rule-making in recent years that may
reflect a sea-change of sorts toward greater interaction between the branches. See also Linda S.
Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking,
69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 843-51 (1991) (criticizing political interference with judicial rule-making
process).
185. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988).
186. The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee included a multi-page summary of
its recommendations, organized alphabetically, by subject. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMrrrEE 172-83 (1990). Fifty-seven recommendations were directed at the judiciary.
Of those 57, five were duplicates, one was directed at the Federal Judicial Center (which is not
within the Judicial Conference's jurisdiction), eight recommended that the judiciary "continue"
existing policies (making Judicial Conference action unnecessary), and six amounted to plati-
tudes (e.g., "Be sensitive to jurors' needs," or "select well-qualified lawyers as magistrates"),
leaving a total of 37 substantive recommendations. See id. (summarizing content of committee's
recommendations).
187. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 60-122 (1990). These figures were derived by tallying the Committee recommendations
1995] 1065
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
ference has since considered and adopted additional Committee
recommendations. 188
Pennsylvania had two counterparts to the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee. The first was the Committee to Study Pennsylvania's Unified Judicial
System, chaired by former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Pomeroy,
which issued a report in 1980.189 The second was the Governor's Judicial
Reform Commission, chaired by Judge Phyllis Beck, which issued its report
in 1988.190 These two groups issued at least twelve recommendations be-
tween them that the supreme court could have implemented without any en-
abling legislation or constitutional amendment. 191 Unlike the United States
Judicial Conference, which promptly reviewed and accepted a significant
number of the Federal Courts Study Committee's recommendations, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted none of the recommendations pro-
adopted or rejected throughout the span of the cited pages, a task simplified by a table of con-
tents corresponding to the Federal Courts Study Committee's alphabetical summary of recom-
mendations, referring the reader to those pages of the annual report where committee
recommendations are discussed. Id. at 121-22.
188. Examples include: (1) conducting a study of inter-circuit conflicts; (2) initiating addi-
tional case-management efforts; (3) having the judicial councils undertake long-range planning;
and (4) reviewing allowable magistrate duties. Interview with David Sellars, Public Affairs Of-
ficer, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Feb. 15, 1995).
189. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE To STUDY PENNSYLVANIA'S UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM
(1980) [hereinafter POMEROY REPORT].
190. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S JUDICIAL REFORM COMMISSION (1988) [hereinafter
BECK REPORT]. A variety of other groups have assembled and studied the Pennsylvania judici-
ary with a primary focus on judicial selection. See, e.g., Judicial Reform Oct. 6, supra note 3, at 5-
102 (testimony of Fred Voight, Executive Director of the Committee of Seventy; Robert Surrick,
Executive Director of the Coalition for Real Judicial Reform; and Jerome Bogutz and Richard
Klein, for Commission for Justice in the 21st Century).
191. These commissions recommended that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: (1) formalize
all administrative policy decisions in the Rules of Judicial Administration, BECK REPORT, supra
note 190, at 50-51, 64-65; (2) delegate to the chief justice responsibility for routine management
of the judicial system, id. at 24-25; POMEROY REPORT, supra note 189, at 30; (3) elect a chief
justice for renewable five-year terms, BECK REPORT, supra note 190, at 52-53; (4) authorize
regionalized administration of the lower courts, id. at 63, 71; (5) develop a program for tempo-
rary assignment of common pleas judges to intermediate appellate courts, id. at 69; (6) establish
minimum personnel, supplies, services, and facilities standards for all local court systems, POME-
ROY REPORT, supra note 189, at 63; (7) create a personnel system to ensure that supreme court
staff are well-trained professionals, BECK REPORT, supra note 190, at 125; POMEROY REPORT,
supra note 189, at 31; (8) make lower court administrators secondarily responsible to the Admin-
istrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, BECK REPORT, supra note 190, at 70; (9) authorize a
stronger, more independent judicial council, POMEROY REPORT, supra note 189, at 36-37; (10)
appoint an ad hoc committee to review rules of administration and make recommendations,
BECK REPORT, supra note 190, at 62; (11) promulgate rules and regulations to establish account-
ing methods for appropriated and unappropriated funds, POMEROY REPORT, supra note 189, at
63; BECK REPORT, supra note 190, at 125-26; and (12) make financial disclosure requirements
for judges at least as full as comparable requirements imposed on other state employees, BECK
REPORT, supra note 190, at 67, 188.
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posed by either the Beck or Pomeroy commissions until all but forced to do
so by the Larsen fiasco. 192
A principal thrust of these reports was to recommend formalizing, regu-
larizing, and increasing the flow of information to, from, and within the
supreme court.193 Nowhere was the need for such reform more obvious than
with respect to the court's rules for handling allocatur petitions, rules which
were largely unpublished and informal.194
Pursuant to informal supreme court practice, allocatur petitions filed
with the court were routinely sent to neighboring law schools, where part-
time "allocatur clerks"-law school professors-would review the petitions
and make recommendations. 195 In Justice Larsen's case, his allocatur clerks
were on the same faculty as a long-time friend and former full-time clerk. 196
This former clerk, in addition to teaching law, affiliated himself with a law
firm that had an active supreme court practice. 197 There is no evidence to
suggest that Justice Larsen's allocatur clerks communicated with the profes-
sor-practitioner about pending petitions of interest to the practitioner or the
firm whose office space he shared. There is, nevertheless, an inescapable ap-
pearance problem created by a professor making recommendations on court
petitions filed by a firm with which the professor's colleague is affiliated.
Under the supreme court's informal rules, a justice could participate in
the allocatur process and influence the court to grant a petition on behalf of a
friend or political contributor, 198 only to recuse herself once the petition was
granted. 199 There are situations in which a justice's decision to participate in
the allocatur process and recuse herself from the later appeal is perfectly
innocent, as, for example, where the justice first becomes aware of a conflict
of interest after the petition is granted. The critical flaw in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's rules was that neither the public, the litigants, nor their law-
yers were made aware of which justices participated in the allocatur process
and which recused themselves. 200 It was thus possible for a justice-such as
192. Interview with William Kent, Assistant Director, Democratic Legislative Develop-
ment, Pennsylvania House Of Representatives (Mar. 3, 1995). The House Judiciary Commit-
tee's Subcommittee on Courts assembled a list of recommendations never implemented from,
among others, the Beck and Pomeroy Reports; Mr. Kent, who assisted the subcommittee in com-
piling that list, confirmed that none of the recommendations directed at the supreme court had
been fully implemented as of the subcommittee's first court reform hearing on July 14, 1994. Id.
193. See supra note 191 and accompanying text for a summary of the main
recommendations.
194. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 29, at 246-47.
195. Id. at 199.
196. HousE REPORT, supra note 32, at 23-28.
197. Id. at 24-25, 28.
198. Succeeding in obtaining such a grant is not an inconsiderable role to play, given that
fewer than one in ten allocatur petitions are granted. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 29, at
198.
199. I Impeachment Trial, supra note 18, at 70 (Aug. 8, 1994) (testimony of Charles Johns).
200. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 29, at 247; I Impeachment Trial, supra note 18, at
100 (testimony of Charles Johns). The United States Supreme Court, in contrast, has listed the
justices not participating in the resolution of petitions for certiorari. See JorN C. JEFFRIES, JUS-
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Larsen-to manipulate the allocatur process without fear of outside
detection.
In addition, individual justices could place "holds" on allocatur petitions,
suspending their resolution for an indefinite period of time without the need
for an explanation.20 1 This not only afforded a dishonorable justice an op-
portunity to manipulate the ebb and flow of supreme court litigation for im-
proper purposes, but also made an honorable justice a potential target, in
that others could impute improper motives to an innocent decision to place a
given matter on hold.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally addressed some of these gaps
in its administration of the allocatur process.20 2 In October 1994, the court
announced that it would revise the manner in which the court processed allo-
catur petitions. 20 3 Among the changes adopted were (1) publishing internal
operating procedures; 20 4 (2) eliminating unlimited and unexplained "holds"
on cases and allocatur petitions;20 5 (3) establishing a central case-tracking
system for every matter filed with the court;20 6 (4) publishing the names of
justices not participating in an allocatur decision;20 7 and (5) moving toward
exclusive reliance upon internal staff (and away from outside allocatur
clerks).20 8
The point to underscore, however, is that it took nothing short of a con-
stitutional crisis to prompt such meaningful change. Blue-ribbon commis-
sions had come and gone with no apparent effect. Not until a supreme court
justice-reprimanded for improper ex parte contacts, indicted on drug
charges, and accused of case-fixing-had charged his brethren with miscon-
duct ranging from bribery to attempted murder did the court begin in earnest
to consider reforms.20 9 Even then, it is unclear if the court would have acted
without the publication of the grand jury report, which laid much of the
blame for the fiasco squarely upon the shoulders of an under-regulated
supreme court and urged the court to take appropriate action.210
In the end, the grand jury report recognized that the ultimate issue was
one of accountability, noting that "[a]lthough we have not attempted to con-
TICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 275-76 (1994) (discussing publication of Justice Powell's recusals
from certain petitions).
201. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 29, at 247.
202. FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ALLOCATUR STUDY COMMITTEE
(June 22, 1994).
203. ADMIN. OFFICE OF PA. COURTS, PRESS RELEASE 3-4 (Oct. 12, 1994) [hereinafter
PRESS RELEASE].
204. Id.
205. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE
SUPREME COURT § 5 (1995).
206. PRESS RELEASE, supra note 203, at 3.
207. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 205, § 6.
208. PREsS RELEASE, supra note 203, at 2-3.
209. The Allocatur Study Committee began its work in January, 1994. PRESS RELEASE,
supra note 203, at 1.
210. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 29, at 246-49.
1068 [Vol. 68
JUDICIAL SELF-REGULATION
duct a comprehensive investigation of the Court, our investigation and the
findings reflected in this report lead us to conclude that part of the problems
or perceived problems are the result of a perceived lack of accountability."211
The grand jury report recommended term limits or shorter terms as a means
to restore accountability. 212 Such measures would not serve the desired end.
As to term limits, it is difficult to understand how a judge not eligible for
reelection would be more accountable to her constituency than one who is.
Shorter terms, on the other hand, assume that the electorate can and will
ferret out incompetent or corrupt jurists. This is an unrealistic assumption
given the public's limited access to information-access limited by the
supreme court itself, pursuant to its exclusive authority over the judicial ad-
ministration and rule-making.213
While accountability is clearly the problem, the solution lies in restoring
the balance of power between the judiciary and the General Assembly. That,
in turn, necessitates an amendment to article V, section 10 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution that would give the General Assembly some form of
concurrent jurisdiction over court administration and procedure. 214 Then,
and only then, will there be a constitutional check in place sufficient to en-
sure competent judicial self-administration. 215
B. Credibility and Judicial Removal
As argued above, an insufficiently blended separation of powers in a tri-
branch system of government, such as that of Pennsylvania, is unhealthy. It
encourages isolation of the branches and facilitates over-concentration of
power in a single branch. There are at least two manifestations of this prob-
lem in the Larsen case. The first, as discussed in the preceding section, is that
such isolation invites a lack of accountability, which in turn invites under-
regulation and mismanagement.216 The second, addressed here, is that with
isolation comes a lack of credibility, painfully illustrated by the supreme
court-dependent mechanisms employed to discipline and remove Justice Lar-
sen from office.
The Larsen saga showcased four distinct methods of judicial discipline
and removal in action, each of which resembles mechanisms in place in other
211. Id. at 248.
212. Id.
213. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited informa-
tion available to voters on judicial candidates.
214. See supra notes 105-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the extreme separa-
tion of powers in place under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
215. In recommending constitutional reform to create concurrent jurisdiction of the judici-
ary and General Assembly over procedure and practice in the Pennsylvania courts, I do not go
as far as Professor Ledewitz, who proposes a constitutional amendment that would give the
supreme court no powers other than those "imposed by law," presumably meaning by the Gen-
eral Assembly. See Ledewitz, supra note 114, at 459 (proposing constitutional amendment limit-
ing supreme court's powers over judicial practice and procedure).
216. See supra notes 173-215 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of account-
ability resulting from the separation of powers under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
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states.217 Of those four, however, only two had been brought to bear in the
180 years preceding Justice Larsen's removal: discipline by the supreme court
upon JIRB recommendation and removal by the trial court upon criminal
conviction. 218 These two mechanisms both make the supreme court the deci-
sion-maker of last resort and may therefore be characterized as supreme
court-dependent mechanisms. A third mechanism, removal by the Court of
Judicial Discipline, is a recent arrival to the Pennsylvania Constitution that
emerged in response to the perceived failings of supreme court-dependent
removal devices.219 It is not supreme court-dependent in cases in which the
miscreant is a supreme court justice, but is intra-judicial in that the final ap-
peal is heard by seven lower court judges chosen by lot.220 Fourth, and fi-
nally, is removal by impeachment and conviction, a mechanism within the
exclusive province of the General Assembly.221
1. Supreme Court-Dependent Removal Mechanisms
Given the extent to which the Pennsylvania Constitution isolates its judi-
ciary by delegating to it alone the responsibility for regulating court opera-
tions, it is unsurprising that the mechanisms of choice for disciplining and
removing judicial officers would likewise be supreme court-dependent. As
argued below, however, such mechanisms are fatally flawed, at least in cases
when the respondent judge is a supreme court justice.
There is an apparent, if not a real, conflict of interest created whenever
supreme court justices, as decision-makers of last resort, discipline or remove
a fellow jurist with whom they share a dais. 222 The American Bar Associa-
217. See, e.g., Timothy R. Murphy, The Effects of Criminal Prosecutions of State Judges on
State Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 1337, 1347 (1993) (comparing judicial removal mecha-
nisms in seven states, including Pennsylvania).
218. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of these two methods
of removal.
219. See infra notes 232-42 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of how
the Court of Judicial Discipline functions.
220. The 12-member Judicial Conduct Board and the eight-member Court of Judicial Disci-
pline are appointed in equal numbers by the governor and the supreme court. PA. CONST. art.
V, § 18(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1). Justices on the supreme court are excluded from membership on both
the Judicial Conduct Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline, which are comprised of speci-
fied numbers of judges, lawyers, and laypeople. Id. Appeals from decisions of the Court of
Judicial Discipline are heard by the supreme court in cases involving the discipline or removal of
a lower court judge; appeals are heard by a seven-member panel of lower court judges, chosen
by lot, in cases involving the discipline or removal of a supreme court justice. Id. art. V,
§ 18(c)(1).
221. Id. art. VI, §§ 4, 5.
222. I am not troubled by judges judging judges per se. I have, for example, argued else-
where that federal chief circuit judges do an excellent job of informally disciplining colleagues in
their circuits. See generally Charles G. Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 243 (1993). I am likewise persuaded by two recent and impressive studies of the
formal self-disciplinary mechanisms within the federal judiciary, that federal judges do a satisfac-
tory job of regulating themselves. See generally Jeffrey Barr & Thomas Willging, Decentralized
Self-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence Under the Federal Judicial Conduct
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tion Standards for Judicial Discipline allude to this problem with the admoni-
tion that disciplinary mechanisms must guard against "any appearance of
favoritism that might arise due to personal ties between the responding judge
and his colleagues on the court. '2 2 3
Consider the general standards for judicial recusal from traditional liti-
gation, and how the principles derived from those standards apply to a justice
of the supreme court who must adjudicate a dispute between a fellow justice
and the JIRB. Under the federal disqualification statute, a judge must recuse
herself from any case in which a party is represented by the judge's former
firm, if the judge was still affiliated with the firm at the time it took the
case.224 The need for automatic disqualification in such cases is clear: by
virtue of her past professional affiliation with the representatives of a party in
a case before her, the judge had access to information that might color her
judgment improperly.
The argument for disqualification seems even stronger when a judge is
currently affiliated with a party in a case before her. It is therefore unsurpris-
ing that only three justices participated in the decision to adopt the JIRB's
recommendation and publicly reprimand Justice Larsen. 225
The justices who did participate, however, cannot be faulted for doing
so. The Pennsylvania Constitution explicitly directed the supreme court to
act upon JIRB recommendations arising out of investigations into the con-
duct of supreme court justices.2 26 Conventional litigation has no corollary.
No statute or rule orders a judge to sit under circumstances in which another
statute or rule requires her recusal.227 The constitution thus presented the
and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1993); Richard Marcus, Who Should Disci-
pline Federal Judges and How?, 149 F.R.D. 375 (1993). The federal self-regulatory scheme is
different from the state mechanisms criticized here. Under the federal system, the court of last
resort is not the handful of judges with whom the target judge sits. Rather, a complainant or
judge dissatisfied with the disciplinary rulings issued on the circuit level may petition the Judicial
Conference of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (1990). This body is comprised of a
cross-section of federal judges from around the country. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
223. ABA STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILTY RETIREMENT § 7.14 cmt.
(1977). See also Judith Rosenbaum, When a High Court Justice Is Charged with Misconduct, 16
JUD. CONDUCT REP. 1 (1994) (discussing how various states handle judicial discipline when
supreme court justice is charged with misconduct).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (1988). Many judges voluntarily recuse themselves from any
case in which their former law firm represents a party. Interview with Senior Circuit Judge
Thomas A. Clark (Jan. 12, 1995). See also JEFFRIES, supra note 200, at 277-78 (discussing Justice
Powell's recusal practices, including his recusal from cases in which Hunton & Williams, his
former firm, was party). Although the statute does not require recusal in all such instances,
many judges nevertheless disqualify themselves pursuant to the general recusal standard, which
states that "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
225. See supra note 36 and accompanying text identifying the judges who did not partici-
pate in the decision to reprimand Justice Larsen.
226. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(g), (h).
227. Courts do speak in terms of a judge's duty to sit, but it is a duty that ends where bias or
conflict of interest begins. See, e.g., United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976)
(noting obligation of judge "not to recuse himself when there is no reason to do so" and holding
1995]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with a Hobson's choice: to de-
cide Justice Larsen's case in the teeth of an obvious conflict of interest, or to
disqualify themselves from deciding the case and thereby shirk their constitu-
tional duty.
A second Hobson's choice followed naturally from the first for the jus-
tices who opted in favor of hearing the case: to find in favor of Justice Lar-
sen, and be accused of doing so because he was their friend; or to find against
him, and be accused of doing so because he was their enemy.228 To make
matters worse, the supreme court controlled the appointment of a majority of
the JIRB, 229 which invited accusations that the court, or at least certain of its
members, manipulated JIRB investigations.230
Removal by the trial judge upon criminal conviction, like removal by the
supreme court upon JIRB recommendation, requires the supreme court to
serve as ultimate arbiter of a fellow justice's conduct, and to that extent suf-
fers from the same infirmities.231 Moreover, it empowers a single inferior
court judge to remove the highest-ranking judicial officer of the common-
wealth and thereby, in effect, fire her boss. The implications of vesting a
lower court judge with such power is pursued further in the next section.
2. Removal by the Court of Judicial Discipline
The depressing spectacle created by these two supreme court-dependent
disciplinary mechanisms in action finally gave way to constitutional reform,
borne of the recognition that the supreme court could not be the final judge
of its own conduct and retain credibility.232 Pennsylvania voters thus abol-
that requisite allegations of prejudice had not been made); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797
(2d Cir. 1966) (noting that "there is as much obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself when
there is no occasion as there is for him to do so when there is"). The Pennsylvania Constitution,
in contrast, directed justices to adjudicate disciplinary actions involving fellow justices in which
there is an inevitable conflict of interest.
228. Justice Larsen, for example, accused Justices Zappala and Cappy of pursuing discipli-
nary action against Larsen as a means to "railroad[ I" him, "for purposes relating to their own
interests in seizing, exercising and retaining disproportionate power and control in the business
and affairs of this court." GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 29, at 167.
229. PA. CONsT. art. V, § 18(a).
230. Justice Larsen accused Justices Cappy and Zappala of urging JIRB members "to make
an adverse recommendation" against Justice Larsen; but for their interference, Justice Larsen
concluded, "it is likely [he] would have been exonerated." GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 29,
at 100.
231. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not ruled on Justice Larsen's appeal from his
criminal conviction, but only two justices participated in his earlier appeal from a lower court
order denying his petition to stay Senate impeachment trial proceedings, and it can be assumed
that the appeal of his criminal conviction will likewise be sparsely attended by members of the
court. See Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 646 A.2d 694, 704 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (denying Larsen's
request for preliminary injunction and holding that impeachment involves adjudication process
in which courts have no power to intervene); see generally Frank Reeves, Justices Reject Larsen's
Appeal/Former Justice Faces Impeachment Trial in Senate Tomorrow, PrITSBURGH POST-GA-
zaE-rE, June 12, 1994, at El.
232. See supra note 62 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the public percep-
tions resulting from Justice Larsen's removal from the court.
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ished the JIRB and created the Judicial Conduct Board and Court of Judicial
Discipline. 233
The new system addresses a number of the credibility problems inherent
in supreme court-dependent approaches. First, the supreme court does not
appoint a majority of the Judicial Conduct Board or the Court of Judicial
Discipline; rather, the supreme court and the governor each appoint half of
the membership of each body.234 Second, the Court of Judicial Discipline
has more independence and power than its predecessor, the JIRB. It makes
decisions, not recommendations. 235 Moreover, its findings of fact may not be
reversed on appeal unless "clearly erroneous," and the sanctions it imposes
may not be set aside as long as they are "lawful. '236 Third, and finally, an ad
hoc panel of lower court judges-not the supreme court-hears appeals from
decisions of the Court of Judicial Discipline in cases concerning supreme
court justices.2 37
Commentators have praised this form of judicial removal precisely be-
cause it is independent of the supreme court, and thereby solves certain cred-
ibility problems associated with a system in which the supreme court
disciplines and removes its own.2 3 8 On the other hand, what that system
gains in credibility it loses in accountability by empowering lower court
judges to remove high court judges.2 39
The constitution places ultimate responsibility for the health and well-
being of the Pennsylvania judiciary upon the shoulders of the supreme court.
It is therefore the supreme court's responsibility to supervise the lower
courts. The new disciplinary scheme has given lower court judges, the
supervisees, disciplinary power over supreme court justices, the supervisors.
It is a power unencumbered by a corresponding responsibility for the conse-
quences of its exercise. The constitution does not hold the lower courts ac-
countable for the care and feeding of the judiciary. Nor do the voters.2 40 Put
233. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the creation of the
Judicial Conduct Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline.
234. PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 18(a)(1), (b)(1).
235. Id. § 18(b)(5).
236. Id. § 18(c)(2).
237. Id. § 18(c)(1).
238. See generally Rubin G. Cohn, Comparing the One- and Two-Tier Systems, 63 JUDICA-
TURE 244, 248 (1979) (rejecting criticisms of two-tier system of judicial discipline and arguing
that private informal reprimands, employed by unitary system, may be used in cases of flagrant
judicial misconduct); Frank Greenberg, The Illinois "Two-Tier" Judicial Disciplinary System:
Five Years and Counting, 54 CH1.-KENT L. REV. 69, 77 (1977) (indicating preference for Illinois'
two-tier system of judicial discipline as it insulates judicial inquiry board and court commission
from any significant degree of control by judicial, executive, and legislative branches of
government).
239. Note that this criticism loses some force in cases involving the removal of lower court
judges. In such cases the supreme court is the decision-maker of last resort, which is considera-
bly less troubling, given that the constitution explicitly charges the supreme court with the re-
sponsibility to supervise the lower courts. PA. CONsT. art. V, § 18(c)(i).
240. The sections of the Pennsylvania Constitution discussed previously in connection with
the election and retention of supreme court justices apply with equal force to lower court judges.
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another way, the lower court judges who review a Court of Judicial Discipline
decision to remove a supreme court justice are accountable only to their
consciences.
It may not seem like a bad thing for a judge to be accountable only to
her conscience; it is, after all, at the heart of judicial independence. But the
business of putting the highest-ranking judicial officer of a state on trial for
misconduct in office, and removing her if guilty, is not merely a judicial act.
It is a political act. The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Re-
moval, a group of federal legislators, state and federal judges, representatives
of the executive branch, and assorted academics commissioned by federal
statute to evaluate the federal impeachment process and its alternatives, un-
derscored this point in its report:
[T]he process of judicial removal should remain political. To place
removal of federal judges in the hands of a body less electorally
responsible than Congress would shift the constitutional balance
significantly in the direction of unaccountability. Moreover, as the
framers recognized, impeachable offenses by government officials
are by their nature political crimes, both because they involve
breaches of the public trust and because they represent misuse of
office. ... Judging whether the public trust has been violated or the
power granted by the people misused is fundamentally a political
decision, one that should be made by officers who answer to the
voters. 2
41
One can quarrel with extending the Commission's analysis to intra-judi-
cial removal of lower court judges at the state level, where the removal deci-
sion is arguably less "political" than "administrative. ' 242 But the point is
incontrovertible as it applies to the removal of a supreme court justice.
When a supreme court justice is accused of misconduct, it is news because it
concerns a high-ranking official in a position of state-wide public trust who
may have violated that trust. Whether such a violation occurred, and if so
whether the justice should be removed from office, are thus issues properly
for the public to decide through their elected representatives.
See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the process of electing judges
in Pennsylvania.
241. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 23
(1993) [hereinafter JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REPORT].
242. Indeed, the American Judicature Society quarreled with the Commission's conclusion
as it applied to federal judges. The president stated:
With all due respect to the Commission, the American Judicature Society does not
concur in the conclusion that there is a constitutional impediment to removal of federal
judges by an alternative to impeachment. In addition based on the experience of the
states we believe there is much to be gained from an appropriate alternative. Such
alternatives have not proven to be a threat to judicial independence in the states and
removal occurs only for egregious misconduct.
HEARINGS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 727 (June 24,
1993) (statement of Frances Zemans, President, American Judicature Society).
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3. Removal upon Impeachment and Conviction
When all is said and done, impeachment in the House followed by con-
viction in the Senate remains the most satisfactory mechanism for removing
high court judges, because of the intermingled separation of powers balance
it preserves. Unlike judges, members of the General Assembly are directly
accountable to the electorate in frequent elections. In his opening statement
before the Senate Special Committee on Impeachment, Representative
Frank Dermody, Chairman of the House Managers, emphasized this point:
Justice Larsen is not the only one on trial here today. You are on
trial as well, each of you, your committee, your Senate. And just as
you will try Justice Rolf Larsen, you will be tried [in] the court of
public opinion, because what is at stake here is not only Justice Rolf
Larsen but the integrity of our constitutional system of
government. 243
Counsel for Justice Larsen echoed Representative Dermody's comments
with his admonition to the Senate Committee that "[y]ou will reach the ver-
dict [on] Justice Larsen; the court of public opinion and our children will
render yours."'244
Moreover, by virtue of its independence, the General Assembly is an
inherently more credible decision-maker of last resort than an intra-judicial
body, be it the supreme court or a panel of lower court judges. Individual
legislators may be accused of harboring hidden or not so hidden agendas that
call their credibility into question, but unlike the judiciary, the General As-
sembly has no institutional bias vis-a-vis removal or retention of a supreme
court justice.
Removal by impeachment and conviction is a mechanism with flaws.
After all, the impeachment and removal process is not just a political one, but
a judicial one as well, and good legislators do not necessarily make good
judges. Students of the state and federal impeachment processes have thus
criticized those processes as unduly cumbersome;245 they have imputed ulte-
rior motives upon participating legislators;246 they have questioned the ca-
pacity of the Senate to make reasoned rulings on the admissibility of
243. I Impeachment Trial, supra note 18, at 33 (Opening Statement of Representative Frank
Dermody).
244. Id. (Opening Statement of William Costopoulos).
245. JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 193 (1962); Michael Broyde, Expediting Im-
peachment. Removing Article III Federal Judges After Criminal Conviction, 17 HARV. J.L. PUB.
POL'Y 157, 158 (1994).
246. See generally Peg Brickley, Shooting Blanks, PITTSBURGH POsT-GAZETTE June 12,
1994, at F1 (questioning motives of state legislature and method of examination used in im-
peachment case of Rolf Larsen).
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evidence;247 and they have second-guessed the Senate's findings of fact in
particular cases.248
It is beyond the scope of this article to defend the impeachment process
against its critics, an effort that has been ably undertaken by others.249 Suf-
fice it to say that when the task is to determine whether a supreme court
justice is fit to remain in office, the impeachment process alone entrusts that
task to a credible and accountable decision-maker.
V. CONCLUSION
An independent judiciary is a good thing. Without it, fair and principled
administration of justice is difficult, if not impossible. An unaccountable ju-
diciary, on the other hand, is not a good thing. And when a state constitu-
tion, such as Pennsylvania's, isolates its judiciary by rendering its operations
completely immune to legislative oversight, the line between independence
and unaccountability is crossed. With the specter of legislative intervention
altogether absent, a powerful incentive for vigilant judicial self-regulation is
removed. An under-regulated judiciary is a natural, if not the inevitable,
consequence. That, in turn, gives rise to inefficiency, mismanagement, and,
in some cases, corruption. I do not quarrel with those who argue that the
quality of the Pennsylvania judiciary would be much improved if judges were
chosen on the basis of merit, rather than in partisan elections. But the state
constitution must be amended to restore the balance of power between the
judicial and legislative branches, by giving the General Assembly shared re-
sponsibility over judicial administration and rule-making, be it akin to that
afforded the United States Congress over the operation of the federal judici-
ary or some other variation. Unless or until that is done, the Larsen saga
could too easily repeat itself, with or without merit-based judicial selection.
Just as shared separation of powers is important to good judicial admin-
istration, so too is it important to judicial discipline and removal. Intra-judi-
cial mechanisms may work well when it comes to disciplining and removing
247. See Michael Gerhardt, The Senate's Process for Removing Federal Judges, in I RE-
SEARCH PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 139,
161 (1993) (noting that proponents of evidentiary rules for impeachment proceedings want Sen-
ate to adopt set of uniform rules that would provide for reliable and nonprejudicial submission
of evidence).
248. See generally Alan Barron, The Curious Case of Alcee Hastings, 19 NOVA L. REV. 873,
877 (1995) (chronicling events which led to impeachment of United States District Judge Alcee
Hastings on charges of perjury and conspiracy to solicit bribe); Larsen Out, Barely, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Oct. 6, 1994, at A24 (recounting impeachment of Justice Larsen).
249. See JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REPORT, supra note 241, at 27-68 (1993) (discussing careful
balance of powers in American impeachment process and need to retain impeachment proce-
dure as means of removing officials who commit serious crime or breach public trust); Gerhardt,
supra note 247, at 161-69 (defending absence of evidentiary rules in impeachment proceedings
on basis that it is "extraordinary hearing"); Warren Grimes, Hundred-Ton Gun Control: Preserv-
ing Impeachment as the Exclusive Removal Mechanism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. REV.
1209, 1254 (1991) (arguing that workable impeachment remedy must be available as ultimate
sanction for judicial discipline).
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lower court judges. As far as removing a supreme court justice is concerned,
however, such mechanisms are inherently flawed. If the supreme court is the
decision-maker of last resort, any decision it renders as to the fate of a col-
league will certainly raise questions about the court's credibility. If a panel of
lower court judges hears the final appeal, unaccountable supervisees are em-
powered to remove their supervisor, which turns the judiciary's chain of com-
mand on its head and overlooks the intrinsically political nature of the
removal.
In such cases, impeachment and conviction remain the only viable means
of judicial removal, which simultaneously delegates the political act of re-
moving a supreme court justice to politically accountable decision-makers
and obviates credibility problems by delegating the removal decision to a
separate branch of government that lacks an obvious personal stake in the
outcome.

